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ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
REGINALD PARKER*

For centuries legal theorists have distinguished between interpretation,

or construction, in the narrower sense of the word, and so-called authentic
interpretation. The latter is interpretation by law.' This conception used
to be of major importance in continental Europe, when an absolute monarch, as the supreme fountainhead of justice and administration, could
not only make the law but also set down its meaning with authentic force. 2

In our time, however, we prefer to speak of amendatory statutes regardless
of whether they, actually or fictitiously, purport to clarify an existing statute
or enact new law.3 Modern legislatures, including our Congress, do not
clothe their laws in the form of binding "opinions."
Apart from interpretation by the statutory lawmaker itself, however, law
may be authentically-i. e., bindingly-construed by an organ on a hierarchical level below that of the legislature. This may be done by a court, or by
an administrative agency having pro tanto the same power as a court, at
least in the Anglo-American conntries, where precedents are binding. 4 The
court, in deciding a question of law which lends itself to several constructions, interprets the law with binding force, not only for the parties involved
in the litigation that gave rise to the decision, but also for the future. In
civil-law countries the court merely decides the issue at bar. Its interpretation of the law has no authority, and is not authentic, except for the litigants.
*Visiting Professor of Law, University ofo Arkansas.-A revised form of this article
will be incorporated in Part Three of the author's forthcoming book, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw: A TEXT, which will soon be published by The Bobbs-Merrill Company.
1. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs 58-59, 86; 1 DERNEURC, SYSTEM DES ROEMISCIIEN
RECHTS 55, 62-63, (8th ed., Sokolowski, 1911), KELSEN, THE LAw OF THE UNITED
NATIONS (Preface "On Interpretation") xiii-xvii (1950).

2. The FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 4, expressly outlaws the prior practice of judges to
inquire with the legislator (king, convention, etc.) as to the meaning of a statute. 1
CENT, METHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVE PosITn' 78 (2d ed.

1919); HEINSHEIMER and others, FRANIE ICIIS CODE CIVIL 2-3 (vol. 1, Die Zivilgesetze
der Cegenwart, 1932). In Austria the practice of judges to seek authentic interpretation
of the civil law from the Emperor prevailed until the 1850's.
3. See CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 622-24 (1940). Amendatory
statutes may be retroactive-as the true authentic interpretation always was; DERNBURO,
supra note 1; cf. Davis, infra note 12, at 949-but the modem view holds that in doubt
it is not.

Benton v. Wickwire, 54 N.Y. 226, 229 (1873); Personnel Finance Co. v.

United States, 86 F. Supp. 779, 785 (D. Del. 1949).
4. The rule that court decisions are binding precedents has been received in international law. See, 0.8., STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 38(d).
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With us, however, the law is bindingly, or authentically, interpreted by the
courts with an effect similar to the above-mentioned binding interpretations,
or amendatory laws, of the legislature itself.5
Interpretations that are not authentic, on the other hand-like any
statutory interpretation or construction in the narrower sense of the wordare not binding.

They merely amount to an intellectual process-a logical

analysis of the meaning of a given statute, regulation, common-law principle,
or the like norm. To be able to interpret the law authentically requires
legal authority. This means that only those who are legally authorized to
make and interpret the law with binding force can legally do so; a statement
which is indeed a tautology. But no authority is needed to construe the law
as a matter of personal opinion, however persuasive the interpreter's point of
view may be. Everybody is free to express himself and to try to influence
others on a point of law.
Modern administrative agencies do a variety of things that cannot always be easily identified as falling into any particular category such as lawmaking, authentic interpretation, or simple construction of the lax'. Many
agencies are authorized to make law, that is, rules or regulations. Others
merely render individual decisions; but inasmuch as these decisions are recognized as having precedential force,7 the agency thereby interprets the law
authentically, subject, at times, to judicial review. It may be added that
every regulation also implicitly interprets the law, i. e., the enabling statute
under whose authority the rule is promulgated. It is, however, preferable not
to use the term interpretation for what can be classified as lawmaking but
rather to continue it to its usual meaning-the clarification, with or without
binding force, of some legal point.
Agencies, however, do not only issue regulations ("quasi-laws") and
decisions. The;' also issue "interpretations," often called "rulings," "decisions," or simply "press releases."e These interpretations may either be

authentic, in which case they must be based on legal authority, or they may
be mere opinions on how the law should be construed. Thus, the so-called
"Treasury Regulations" contain not only true regulations (legal norlns promulgated pursuant to statutory authority),' but also, and closely akin thereto,
authentic interpretations (definitions and explanations likewise promulgated
5.The different approach to judicial opinions ("precedents" here, decisions merely
binding on the individual litigants there) marks, indeed, the differentia specifica between
common and civil law. See Parker, The Criteria of the Civil Law, 7 TIE JURIST 140

(1947).
6.KELSENq, op. cit. supra note 1,at xv.
7. As now expressly recognized in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), 62
HAR V. L. REv. 478 (1949), 18 GYo. WASH. L. REV. 492 (1950). And see United States
ex rel. Knauff v. McGrath, 181 F.Zd 839, 841 (2d Cir. 1950) (agency bound by its own
"invariable" practice). For a negative application of the principle see FPC v. Panhandle
Eastern Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498, 513 (1949) (non-exercise for ten years of certain
powers indication that "Commission did not believe the power existed").
8. E.g., INT. REV. CoDE § 23(p) (1) (deduction for pension trust pursuant to Commissioner's rules), and the regulation in U.S. Treas. Reg. Ill, § 29.2 3 (p).
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pursuant to statutory authority), and also ordinary interpretations which
are mere expressions of the Treasury's opinion on a given provision of the Internal Revenue Code.'0 The Treasury Department apparently does not desire
to make it clear whether its "regulations" and "rulings" are binding or not.1 '
Of course, if there were no judicial supremacy, the difference would be
of small consequence, for if an agency were the ultimate and final authority
on the making and the interpreting of regulations, its announcement that it
will henceforth construe the law in such and such a manner would be as
binding as a regulation since it would be authentic interpretation by the
regulation maker. Judicial control, however, makes it necessary to draw a
line somewhere. The valid regulation and the authentic interpretation are
law, but a non-authentic interpretation of the law by an agency is a mere
opinion on law. The former is binding-since valid law and "binding" are
synonyms-the latter is not. The practical importance of drawing a line
between law (regulation or authentic interpretation) and interpretation,
then, stands and falls with the doctrine of judicial review of administrative
acts including regulations; and the more the doctrine is giving way to
administrative finality, the more the distinction between true regulations
(including authentic interpretation), and mere interpretation becomes obscured. Courts stress the difference particularly whenever they do not want
12
to adopt an agency's interpretation.
The Administrative Procedure Act includes in its definition of rules
stateients designed both to interpret and to prescribe law or policy.' 3 Specifically, "statements of general policy or interpretations formulated and
adopted by the agency for the guidance of the public" must be published
in the Federal Register just like "substantive rules adopted as authorized by
law," unless they are addressed to and served upon named persons.1
However, the rule-making procedure of Section 4 does not apply to "interpretative rules, general statements of policy . . "', In other words, "interpretations" must be published (unless served personally), but no particular
procedure or hearing need precede their formulation.
-

9. E.g., 1lqr. REV. ConE § 23(m) (allowance for depletion under Commissioner's
rules), and the definitions in U.S. Treas. Reg. ill, §§ 29, 23(m)-I.
10. As most provisions of U.S. Treas. Reg. 111.
11. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945);
Siomkin v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 174 F.2d 289, 291-92 (2d Cir. 1949);
United States v. Bonnell, infra note 12; Dwan, The Federal Administrative Procedure
Act and the Bureau of Internal Revenue in THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 146-55 (Warren ed. 1947).
12. E.g., Biddle v. Comm'r, 302 U.S, 573, 582 (1938); United States v. Bonnell,
180 F.2d 145, 148 (9th Cir. 1950) ("regulations," though "re-enacted"--c. infra
notes 32-36--held to be not administrative interpretation of statute but rather in excess
thereof). And see Davis, Administrative Rules-Interpretativc, Legislative, and Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 922-23 (1948).
13. AD. PROC. ACT § 2(c). Of course an interpretation may also construe a mere
regulation rather than a statute. FPC v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.; supra note
7; Woods v. Colt, 85 F. Supp. 667 (1. Del, 1949).
14. AD. PROC. ACT. § 3(a).
15. Id. § 4(a).
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The throwing together of both regulation and interpretation in Sections
2(c) and 3(a) has resulted in relieving the agencies from the otherwise difficult task of distinguishing between either category. No matter what a
broadcasting policy announcement of the Federal Communications Commission may be called, and regardless of whether it be based on actual, concrete
statutory authority (regulation) or on the mere desire of the Commission
to advise the public (non-authentic interpretation), or both, it must now be
published pursuant to Administrative Procedure Act, Section 3(a),6 which
thus goes beyond Section 7 of the Federal Register Act.' 7 This, in a way,
facilitates smooth administration and avoids issues of legal theory.' 8
However, the advantages of this apparent simplification are limited.
The distinction between regulation and interpretation must be maintained
in view of the procedural provision of Section 4. Much depends on the
language in which the "rule" is couched. Where it is merely called "statement of policy," '(interpretative ruling," or the like, no procedure under
Section 4 is necessary.' 9 Nevertheless, many agencies, particularly the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, choose to use words such as "rule," "regulation," or
"ruling" promiscuously for both regulations and interpretations.20 Perhaps
this is done in order to be on the safe side in the event the "rule" should
not be upheld as a statutorily authorized regulation or, which is practically
the same here, an authentic interpretation. In this case the document
may still be treated "with great deference" as the agency's opinion on how
21
to construe the law.
Worse yet, no clarity exists as to which interpretations must be published. The language of the Act neither clarifies the meaning of binding,
authentic interpretation nor draws any limits whatsoever, which, if taken
literally, would mean that every utterance of an agency head relating to the
future conduct of business woulct have to be forwarded to and published
in the Federal Register. So far as can be seen, the agencies have confined
publication to the more fundamentally important interpretations. 2 2 Even
16. See Caldwell, The Federal Communications Commission in TUE
MINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THlE ADMINISTRATIVE ACENClES

1947).
17.
STAT.

It applies only to documents having "legal effect."

FEDERAL

FED. RECD. ACT

500 (1935), 44 U.S.C. § 301 (1946).

AD-

72, 95 (Warren ed.

§ 6,49

18. "I do not believe I have ever thoroughly understood the distinction between an
interpretative rule and other kind of rules. In a sense they are all interpretative of statutory provisions." Caldwell, op. cit. supra note 16, at 95. And see Davis, op. cit. supra
note 12.
19. See, e.g., the Civil Aeronautics Board regulation discussed in Wanner, Effect of
the Administrative Procedure Act Upon the Civil Aeronautics Board in THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT ANn THE APMiNiSTRATIVE

AGENC

S 132-33 (Warren

ed. 1947).
20. Supra notes 8-11.
21. See infra note 29.
22. Wanner, op. cit. supra note 19; Markel, The Impact of the Federal Adminis-

trative Procedure Act on the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act in Tna FEDERAL
PROCEDURE ACT AND TUE ADmINISTRATivE AGENCIES 400-401, 411 (Warren ed. 1947);
Caldwell, supra note 16, at 91; Davis, supra note 12. See also Newman, Government
and Ignorance, 63 IARV. L. REV. 929 (1950).
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this cannot be said, however, in regard to agencies which are not usually
engaged in rule making. Thus, the very important, recent detailed announcement of the National Labor Relations Board of the classes of enterprises
over which the Board will take jurisdiction has been made public only
through the newspapers. 23 The answer is essentially left to the agencies
themselves, inasmuch as there is no sanction against non-publication of an
interpretation. A regulation not published may not be enforced against a
party without knowledge;2 4 but a mere non-authentic interpretation is never
"enforced". The party that does not accept it as correct need not do so
regardless of whether or not the interpretation was made public, since it
will be for the court to decide which legal view is correct. The courts, however, are giving "great weight" to administrative interpretations, though they
be not binding; and unquestionably, this weight is not as great in the case
of unpublished interpretations. 25 All in all, here as elsewhere, the Administrative Procedure Act, despite the obvious intention of its sponsors, has not
clarified the situation. 26 Nor has there been any attempt to define the
agencies' authority to interpret the law authentically by making decisions in
individual cases. In the Chenery case, however, the Supreme Court held
that agency policy may be formulated and announced through individual
decisions." This is, indeed, a far cry from the Administrative Procedure
Act's demand, well-meant, but inadequately cbrried out, that general statements of policy be publicly announced in the Federal Register.
Many judicial decisions, old and new, have emphasized the non-binding
character of ordinary interpretations, holding that "the construction and
interpretation of a statute as applied to justiciable controversies is a judicial
function."28 Other decisions, however, have held otherwise. Courts, according to these opinions, should not disregard administrative interpretations
23. NLRB Press Release R-342, 19 U.S.L.

WEEK

2147 (Oct. 3, 1950). And see

Rawalt Coal Co., 92 N.L.R.B. No. 12 (1950), where the Board, while agreeing that

respondent's operations affect commerce, dismissed the case "in accord with our announced policy."
24, FED. REC. ACT § 7, supra note 17.
25, Biddle v. Comm'r, supra note 12.
26. The inadequacy of the Administrative Procedure Act reaches a climax in its attempt to define "rules" against "orders." An. PRoc. ACT §§ 2(c) and (d), which were
drawn in such a fashion that it can be said that "any action fits both definitions." Note,
56 Yale L.J. 670, 680 (1947). and see Parker, The Administrative Procedure Act; A
Study in Overestimation, 60 YALE L.J. (1951).
27. Supra note 7.
28. Woods v. Benson Hotel Corp., 177 F.2d 543, 546 (8th Cir. 1949), And see
Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 132 (1947); Comm'r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465,
469 (1946); Overnight Motor Transport Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 580 (1942); John
Breuner Co. v. Comm'r, 179 F.2d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 1950); Busch's Kredit jewelry Co.
v. Comm'r, 179 F.2d 298, 300 (2d Cir. 1950); Bertoldi v. McGrath, 178 F.2d 977
(D.C. Cir. 1949); Siomkin v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., supra note 11;
Albright v. United States, 173 F.2d 339, 340, 345 (8th Cir. 1949); Aluminum Co. of
America v. United States, 123 F.2d 615, 620 (3d Cir. 1941); Van Antwerp v. United
States, 92 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1937); Ambassador Co. v. Comm'r, 81 F.2d 474,
481 (9th Cir. 1936); Farmers Cooperative Co. v. Birmingham, 86 F. Supp. 201, 228.29
(N.D. Iowa 1949); United States v. U.S. Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59, 71
(S.D. N.Y. 1949); Woods v. Golt, 85 F. Supp. 667; 673 (D. Del. 1949).
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unless "plainly and palpably inconsistent with the law," ' which of course
puts them on the same level as regulations, for they, too, are binding only if
not inconsistent with the enabling law. Between these two apparent extremes lies the golden middle: interpretations, which, "while not controlling
upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance."

Their weight depends "upon . . . the validity of its

reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control."3 0
This seems to be the best description of agency interpretations, since it
amounts to saying that for a normative statement to be binding it must be
authorized by law;31 everything else can be merely persuasive. As we are not
prepared to admit the existence in our legal system of a general norm that
authorizes agencies to make any law they see fit (in which case any interpretation would in fact be a binding regulation), but rather restricts them
to following the doctrine of strict legality, we must accept interpretations as
what they are-mere expert guidance.
Prominent among the factors which enhance the weight of an official
interpretation has been the so-called re-enactment doctrine whereby, if Congress re-enacts without change a provision which was administratively ininterpreted, the interpretation is thus incorporated, as it were, in the congressionally re-enacted statute.3 2 This theory vests re-enacted administrative
interpretations with authentic force. However, the courts have adopted this
doctrine with varying degrees of enthusiasm,3 3 It has been rejected, for instance, where the statute was re-enacted "with no direct evidence whatsoever
that Congress was aware" of an agency's (incorrect, as the court held) con29. Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 467-69 (1900). And see FPC v. Panhandle
Eastern Pipe Line Co., supra note 7 (interpretation by silence); Bowles v. Seminole Rock

& Sand Co., supra note 11; FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 352 (1941); Woods v.
Oak Park Chateau Corp., 179 F.2d 611, 613 (7th Cir. 1949); Woods v. Macken, 178

F.2d 510, 513 (4th Cir. 1949); Roberts v. Comm'r, 176 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1949);

Continental Oil Co. v. Jones, 80 F. Supp. 340, 344 (W.D. Okla. 1948), aff'd, however,
in more reticent language, 176 F.2d 519, 523 (10th Cir. 1949); Caldwell, op. cit. supra
note 16, at 95.
30. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); Flour Mills of America,
Inc. v. RFC, 179 F.2d 965, 968-69 (Em. App. 1950). And see Norwegian Nitrogen
Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933); Edward's Lessee v. Darby,
12 Wheat, 206, 210 (U.S. 1827); Continental Oil Co. v. Jones, 176 F.2d 519, 523
(10th Cir. 1949); Fred Wolferman, Inc. v. Gustafson, 169 F.2d 759, 763 (8th Cir.
1948); Anderson v. Arvey Corp., 84 F. Supp. 55, 63 (E.D. Mich. 1949); Davis, op.
cit. snora note 12, at 936-39.
31. See KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 152 et seq. (1945); KELSEN,
THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 1, at xv.
32. E.g., lHelvering v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110 (1939); Helvering v.

Winmill, 305 U.S. 79 (1938); Hartley v. Comm'r, 295 U.S. 216 (1935); United States
v. Cerecedo Hermanos, 209 U.S. 337 (1908); United States v. Falk, 204 U.S. 143

(1907); Keystone Automobile Club v. Comm r, 181 F.2d 402, 405-6 (3d Cir. 1950);
Woods v. Oak Park Chateau Corp., and Roberts v. Comm'r, supra note 29; Aluminum

Co. of America v. United States, supra note 28; Davis, op. cit. supra note 12, at 939.
33. Pacific Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 184 F.2d 272, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1950), holds
that "at best the re-enactment of statutes is a nebulous foundation for statutory construction."
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struction of a statute,3 4 or simply because the law was "plain." 35 Nor has
the re-enactment theory prevented agencies, with the approval of the courts,
from later promulgating interpretations which differed from, and altered,
the "re-enacted" construction.3 0 Other reasons for attaching preponderant
weight to administrative interpretations exist where the interpretation was
made contemporaneously with the statute by those familiar with the legislative intent, 7 or where it is one of long standing. 8
Summarizing the above, concededly confusing, picture, we must remind
ourselves that it reflects a situation peculiar to administrative law. The
Congress makes and amends, but does not interpret, the law. The judiciary
makes law as well as interprets both its own and statutory law, but it does
not issue non-authentic interpretations, such as policy statements. The
administrative-executive branch of the government, on the other hand,
indulges in all these acts. Some of them are regulations, plainly designated and published as such; others are mere non-authentic interpretations whose character as not binding statements can be ascertained from
the fact that they are not published in the Federal Register,8 9 though under
the Administrative Procedure Act every interpretation, authentic or not,
is supposed to be published; yet other administrative acts cannot readily be
identified as either binding or not. They are, indeed, published in the
Register, and, therefore, ought to be, and often are, statements which are
intended to serve as a "guidance of the public." They make reference
to some statutory authority, but that does not establish their character
either, for both regulation and authentic, as well as non-authentic, inter-.
pretation have just that in common that they all either implement, or construe, law. Finally, those agencies which decide individual administrative
cases thereby also interpret the law. The Administrative Procedure Act
has not been able to delimit these many categories in an orderly fashion.
Perhaps that Act is a modern proof of the holding of the Historic School
34. Kristensen v. McGrath, 179 F.2d 796, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Pacific Power
& Light Co. v. FPC, su pra note 33. And see United States v. Missouri Pacific R.R.
278 U.S. 269 (1929); Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275
(1946). See also Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), where an interpretation
was rejected by the Court despite the fact that Congress specifically considered both statute
and existing administrative interpretation and yet turned down a proposed amendment.
35. Biddle v. Comm'r, supra note 12; Helvering v. Clifford, supra note 34; United
States v. Bonnell, supra note 12; Chattanooga Automobile Club v. Comm'r, 182 F.2d
551, 555 (6th Cir. 1950) (not Treasury Regulation but mere "ruling").
36. Elelvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90 (1938).
37. White v. Winchester Country Club, 315 U.S. 32 (1942); Norwegian Nitrogen
Products Co. v. United States, supra note 30; Edward's Lessee v. Darby, supra note 30;
Davis, op. cit. supra note 12, at 936.
38. Comm'r v. Flowers, supra note 28; Boehm v. Comm'r, 326 U.S. 287, 292
(1945); Helvering v. Winmill, supra note 32; Smythe v. Fiske, 90 U.S. 374, 382 (1874);
Conm'r. v. Nubar, 185 F. 2d 584, 587 (4th Cir. 1950); Flour Mills of America, Inc. v.
RFC,supra note 30; Davis, op. cit. supra note 12, at 937.
39. In order to be binding an agency regulation or interpretation must be published
in the Register. FED. REG. ACT. § 7, supra note 17.
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of Law"0 that a time, in order to be "ripe" for the codification of law, must
have reached a high level in the science of that law. That time, seemingly,
41
has not yet arrived.

40. FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, VOM BERUF UNSRER ZEIT FUER GESETZGEBUNG
UND RECIITSWISSECsHAFT (3d ed. 1840). There exist several English translations. For

a good recent evaluation see KOSCHAKER, EUROPA UND DAS ROEMISCHE REIIT 258-59
(1947). See also Parker, Book Review, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 975 (1948).

41. For further proof one need only compare the Administrative Procedure Act with
its generalities that rarely spell out a specific rule of law with, say, the Negotiable Instruments Acts or the Restatement of Torts with their finely spun, detailed statements. Parker,
op. cit. eupra note 26.

